*To*: cl-isabelle-users at lists.cam.ac.uk*Subject*: Re: [isabelle] Some remarks on natural deduction and axiomatic set theory*From*: Gottfried Barrow <igbi at gmx.com>*Date*: Thu, 17 Dec 2015 17:02:48 -0600*In-reply-to*: <B43EAE87-795B-4A55-9A4D-0A694050CBB4@kenkubota.de>*References*: <B43EAE87-795B-4A55-9A4D-0A694050CBB4@kenkubota.de>*User-agent*: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.2; WOW64; rv:11.0) Gecko/20120312 Thunderbird/11.0

Ken,

*2ND THING 1ST, PUT UP OR...*

* 1ST THING 2ND, LEARN SOME DECENT ETIQUETTE* What I say now is at least as important as what I just said.

*QUOTE? LINKS INSTEAD, CONCERNING PURITY*

"Since my philosophical background rejects any sort of metatheories... "

Anyway, http://www.cs.nyu.edu/pipermail/fom/2015-October/019312.html http://www.cs.nyu.edu/pipermail/fom/2015-October/019282.html http://www.cs.nyu.edu/pipermail/fom/2015-October/date.html http://www.cs.nyu.edu/pipermail/fom/2015-September/date.html Pay attention, or not, to Larry Paulson: It looks like I need to clarify my remark about âimposing unreasonable costsâ. Under this I do not include the difficulty of implementing a proof assistant, because our job is to build things and let the computer do the work. The costs rather are those imposed on users who have to work within the free logic. I often compare theorem proving in a formal logic to building a ship in a bottle, and nobody wants to make the bottle any smaller, or the ship any bigger. To be more precise, I have seen proof-theoretic work showing that very small changes to a proof calculus can increase the length of a formal proof, in the worst case, by a non-elementary factor. It isnât obvious that the use of a free logic would be as costly as that, but I get the impression that users who have tried such systems have not been happy with the effort involved. I donât believe that good automation could entirely eliminate this effort. *PAYING HOMAGE TO A MATHEMATICIAN WHO CARED * I forgot how I was supposed to use this, but it's about Robert M. Solovay. Steven Obua published "Partizan Games in Isabelle/HOLZF": https://mediatum.ub.tum.de/doc/1094432/1094432.pdf

https://groups.google.com/forum/#!msg/fa.isabelle/fKOEdb7uqJk/qYY1-MNxwSsJ Solovay writes:

is not what I'm interested in. Your version: [HOL in ZFC] has the same consistency strength as ZFC. My version [ZFC in HOL] would have consistency strength considerably greater than ZFC [just a shade less than Zermolo + Choice + "There is an inacessible cardinal]. How can I tie this into you, Ken?

*THE NEW GAME*

*DISCO, TRUST ME ON THIS ONE*

That's not to say that some things don't stay the same.

Oh, you're the martial artist type, kung fu maybe?

Well, you get the picture. Or maybe you don't. Regards, GB On 12/16/2015 12:29 PM, Ken Kubota wrote:

Dear Gottfried Barrow and List Members, Thank you for your comment at https://lists.cam.ac.uk/pipermail/cl-isabelle-users/2015-December/msg00023.html concerning my note available at https://lists.cam.ac.uk/pipermail/cl-isabelle-users/2015-December/msg00018.html Let me respond to the last three paragraphs of your comment quoted below which summarize the most important questions. 1. There is no relation between a simple minimum core logic and the expressiveness of the formal language. A modular software design guarantees a clear separation of functionality such that the logic is concentrated in the logical core and no enhancements of other software layers (i.e., user interface, proof tactics) will have an effect on the correctness of the logic. This concept is, according to Andrei Popescu, shared by all implementations in discussion here: "A small logic kernel is an implementation-independent virtue of Isabelle/HOL as well as of all the Gordon-HOL systems." "It is the logical reliability due to reduction that builds the core of the LCF-approach to theorem proving (or LCF-style full expansiveness [cf. Gordon, 2000, p. 178]): 'All proofs are ultimately performed in terms of a small set of primitive inferences, so provided this small logical kernel is correct the results should be reliable.' [Harrison, 2009, p. 60]" [Kubota, 2015a, pp. 12 f.] The idea behind the LCF-approach appealing also to those who do not share metatheoretical concepts such as the semantic approach (model theory) is to reduce the set of rules and elements, such that the logical core is minimized without loss of expressiveness. I called it the "The Principle of Reductionism" [Kubota, 2015a, p. 11]. In Peter B. Andrews' logic Q0 this principle is - by the use of syntactical means only - consequently carried out, such that the basic means of the language are reduced without loss of expressiveness to - a single rule of inference, - a single variable binder, - only two constants and - only two types, obtaining "definability of all of the propositional connectives, as well as all of the quantifiers (universal, existential and uniqueness quantifier)" and derivability of all other rules including the rule of modus ponens as mentioned earlier at https://lists.cam.ac.uk/pipermail/cl-isabelle-users/2015-July/msg00147.html In other words, with this simple minimum core logic of Q0 all of formal logic and large parts of mathematics, and with type variables (polymorphic type theory) and the binding of type variables with lambda (dependent type theory), presumably all of mathematics can be construed, expressed and proved purely syntactically. Due to its simplicity, the logical kernel becomes extremely small and logically robust, i.e., mathematically safe. In the R0 implementation, the propositional connectives therefore are not part of the logical core, but their definitions are "outsourced" into a file and, for example, the rule of modus ponens into a separate proof template file. In fact, the expressiveness of R0 as a logistic system is stronger than that of Isabelle/HOL. Isabelle/HOL allows for type variables and therefore has the expressiveness of polymorphic type theory, but only R0 allows, in addition to that, the binding of type variables with lambda as abstraction operator and therefore enables the construction of types required for dependent type theory. 2. Any axiom schema requires a meta-level for instantiation. Since my philosophical background rejects any sort of metatheories (I prefer to speak of arithmetization of mathematics instead of metamathematics, refuting any foundational or legitimating role of metatheories), an axiom schema - like any other meta-construction - always reveals a deficit. Whereas Andrews' logic Q0 requires an "Axiom Schema 3" [Andrews, 2002, p. 213] (with "syntactical variables ranging over type symbols" [Andrews, 2002, p. 210]) for the Axiom of Extensionality, R0 uses regular type variables for this axiom [cf. Kubota, 2015a, pp. 39, 351], which were not available in Q0 being a simple type theory, i.e., without type variables. Moreover, axiomatic set theory as a whole is subject to critique: "Axiomatic set theory uses axioms to justify the existence of certain sets. Unless the proof of existence from these axioms is provided, any construction cannot be introduced into the domain of discourse. This approach, however, is not systematic and subject to arbitrary conditions. For example, the most common formulation, the Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the Axiom of Choice (ZFC), comprises axioms for the empty set, union, one-element sets, power sets etc., trying to cover the standard sets used in mathematics. But there always remain legitimate sets not contained by these axioms; for example it is well known that large cardinal numbers and certain universes cannot be treated within ZFC (without assuming additional axioms), although from a purely logical point of view there is no difference between the mathematical objects covered by ZFC and those not covered. This problem has its origin in the approach itself, as axiomatic set theory makes use of non-logical axioms to establish sets, thus trying to avoid paradoxes via content restrictions instead of the proper specification of the formal language. Opting this method, axiomatic set theory including ZFC is bound to remain a preliminary and auxiliary approach, but not the foundation of mathematics." [Kubota, 2015a, p. 18]. 3. Russell's paradox ("the set of all sets that are not members of themselves", or originally: "Let w be the predicate: to be a predicate that cannot be predicated of itself. [...] Likewise there is no class (as a totality) of those classes which, each taken as a totality, do not belong to themselves." [Russell, 1902, p. 125]) with the two constitutive properties of antinomies, self-reference and negativity (negation), ruled out Cantor's naive set theory as a foundation of mathematics. If Goedel's construction of a proposition involving self-referencing negativity ("I am not provable", or originally: "We therefore have before us a proposition that says about itself that it is not provable" [GÃdel, 1931, p. 598]) has to be considered as an antinomy, further research will have to find out whether it rules out natural deduction (including sequent calculus) for the foundation of mathematics as a whole or whether a clear distinction of the object language and the meta-language can be introduced into natural deduction. The strict distinction of the object language and the meta-language was so important to Church that he emphasized it a second time in his article: "We must, of course, distinguish between formal theorems, or theorems of the system, and syntactical theorems, or theorems about the system, this and related distinctions being a necessary part of the process of using a known language (English) to set up another (more exact) language." [Church, 1940, p. 61] In natural deduction, as for example in Isabelle, metatheorems (in terms of Hilbert-style systems) become part of the formal language (the object language) itself. So from the point of view of axiomatic (Hilbert-style) deductive systems, the expressiveness in natural deduction is shifted towards the meta-level, possibly at the cost of expressiveness at the object level. This caused me to introduce an own terminology with the notions of "object logic" and "meta-logic" in my second publication on Goedel [cf. Kubota, 2015] until realizing that the definitional line between "object logic" and "meta-logic" is identical with that between axiomatic (Hilbert-style) deductive systems and natural deduction, having found the number of allowed occurrences of the deduction symbol (turnstile) in a theorem as a formal criterion. The translation mechanism from a theorem to the existence of its proof (or vice versa) in Goedel's First Incompleteness Theorem is in Paulson's presentation his theorem 'proved_iff_proved_PfP' - called (P) in my article -, in Andrews' presentation the implicit rule used for step 7101.4. Whereas in Andrews' system this implicit rule immediately results in inconsistency [cf. Kubota, 2015, pp. 10 f.], I am not sure whether this applies to natural deduction, too. Because of a limited expressiveness at the object level, the antinomy might be construed without causing an openly visible inconsistency in the formal language, since "the two occurrences of the deduction symbol [...] remain an obstacle for obtaining a paradox [i.e., an inconsistency] in the metalogic [i.e., in natural deduction]" [Kubota, 2015, p. 14]. Then, "GÃdel's first incompleteness theorem: If consistent, our theory is incomplete." (Paulson) is rendered from a hypothetical judgement to a trivial tautology in the form of a conclusio ex falso, since the theory under consideration is actually inconsistent. However, an antinomy (paradox) should not be expressible at all (in formal logic and mathematics). If natural deduction is ruled out for the foundation of mathematics, there would be no other "fix" for Isabelle than switching to an axiomatic (Hilbert-style) deductive system. Then, if one does not want to downgrade from higher-order logic (which would artificially limit the expressiveness of the language) and prefers to remain in the realm of Russell's invention, namely type theory [cf. Russell, 1908], basically three options would be left: a) Church's Hilbert-style system of 1940 [cf. Church, 1940] (simple type theory, i.e., without type variables) b) Andrews' logic Q0 [cf. Andrews, 2002, pp. 210-215], an improved formulation with identity (equality) as the main notion (also simple type theory, i.e., without type variables), first published in 1963 as a simplification of Henkin's variant of Church's formulation [cf. Andrews, 1963, pp. 345 f., 350] and described at https://lists.cam.ac.uk/pipermail/cl-isabelle-users/2015-July/msg00147.html c) my own logic R0 [cf. Kubota, 2015a] (polymorphic and dependent type theory, i.e., with type variables and types depending on arguments due to type variables bound with lambda), a further development of Q0, described at https://lists.cam.ac.uk/pipermail/cl-isabelle-users/2015-July/msg00170.html In his Ph.D. thesis, Andrews developed a transfinite type theory with type variables Q [cf. Andrews, 1965, pp. 3-8], which is already some sort of polymorphic type theory. But instead of consequently reducing the variable binders to a single one as in Q0 (with the abstraction operator and single variable binder lambda, obtaining definability of the universal, existential and uniqueness quantifier) at the type level of Q also, which would have built the foundation of a dependent type theory, the universal quantifier becomes a true variable binder (an improper symbol) in the case of types (for details [cf. Kubota, 2015a, p. 31]). Concerning Isabelle, I do not believe that "30 years" and "millions of dollars" are simply lost. Both Goedel's First Incompleteness Theorem and natural deduction have been publicly available for about 80 years now, in relation to which shorter periods and any economic quantities appear relatively small. I highly value Paulson's presentation of Goedel's First Incompleteness Theorem, which, unlike all other presentations I studied (Andrews and Rautenberg), does not use a shortcut for (P), but a proven theorem, leaving only the (rather methodological) implicit assumptions of - natural deduction (or at least the lack of a clear distinction of the object language and the meta-language) and - the semantic approach (model theory invented by Tarski), assuming otherwise correctness of the syntactical inference in Isabelle. Maybe this fully formalized presentation of Goedel's First Incompleteness Theorem by Professor Paulson as the climax in the development and application of the Isabelle proof assistant software was even a necessary step for evaluating the implications (and potential deficits) of natural deduction. Following the arguments given above, the path to the natural and ideal formulation of formal logic and mathematics is narrowed down to higher-order logic in the form of a Hilbert-style type theory, unless natural deduction is reformulated in a way that preserves the distinction of the object language and the meta-language, and the possibility of offering clarification here seems to me to be one of the most important tasks at present. In order to do so, I suggest the careful examination of Paulson's presentation of Goedel's First Incompleteness Theorem under consideration of the critique of James R. Meyer [cf. Meyer, 2015] and myself both printed [cf. Kubota, 2013; Kubota, 2015] and online at https://lists.cam.ac.uk/pipermail/cl-isabelle-users/2015-December/msg00018.html This seems even more important, as with the critique of natural deduction or certain modes of its implementation, all current major theorem provers, such as - Lawrence C. Paulson's Isabelle (proof claimed by Lawrence C. Paulson), - Coq by INRIA et al. (proof claimed by Russell O'Connor), and - Mike Gordon's original HOL system and its variants, including - John Harrison's HOL Light (proof claimed by John Harrison), might be affected, as they all rely - either as the single form of inference or as one of several components - on natural deduction (considering sequent calculus as a subcase here, defining natural deduction as opposed to Hilbert-style systems). The only older theorem prover, in which Goedel's First Incompleteness Theorem was claimed to be proven, - Robert S. Boyer's and J. Strother Moore's Nqthm (proof claimed by Natarajan Shankar), obviously allows the instantiation of metatheorems, which might violate the object language ("Proved meta-theorems can be installed as simplifiers", http://www-formal.stanford.edu/clt/ARS/Entries/nqthm, December 13, 2015). Kind regards, Ken Kubota References Andrews, Peter B. (1963), "A reduction of the axioms for the theory of propositional types". In: Fundamenta Mathematicae 52, pp. 345-350. Andrews, Peter B. (1965), A Transfinite Type Theory with Type Variables. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company. Andrews, Peter B. (2002), An Introduction to Mathematical Logic and Type Theory: To Truth Through Proof. Second edition. Dordrecht / Boston / London: Kluwer Academic Publishers. ISBN 1-4020-0763-9. DOI: 10.1007/978-94-015-9934-4. Church, Alonzo (1940), "A Formulation of the Simple Theory of Types". In: Journal of Symbolic Logic 5, pp. 56-68. GÃdel, Kurt (1931), "On formally undecidable propositions of Principia mathematica and related systems I". In: Heijenoort, Jean van, ed. (1967), From Frege to GÃdel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 1879-1931. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, pp. 596-616. Kubota, Ken (2013), On Some Doubts Concerning the Formal Correctness of GÃdel's Incompleteness Theorem. Berlin: Owl of Minerva Press. ISBN 978-3-943334-04-3. DOI: 10.4444/100.101. See: http://dx.doi.org/10.4444/100.101 Kubota, Ken (2015), GÃdel Revisited. Some More Doubts Concerning the Formal Correctness of GÃdel's Incompleteness Theorem. Berlin: Owl of Minerva Press. ISBN 978-3-943334-06-7. DOI: 10.4444/100.102. See: http://dx.doi.org/10.4444/100.102 Kubota, Ken (2015a), On the Theory of Mathematical Forms (Draft of May 18, 2015). Unpublished manuscript. SHA-512: a0dfe205eb1a2cb29efaa579d68fa2e5 45af74d8cd6c270cf4c95ed1ba6f7944 fdcffaef2e761c8215945a9dcd535a50 011d8303fd59f2c8a4e6f64125867dc4. DOI: 10.4444/100.10. See: http://dx.doi.org/10.4444/100.10 Meyer, James R. (2015), "A Fundamental Flaw in An Incompleteness Proof by StanisÅaw Åwierczkowski" (v2 30 Apr 2015). SHA-512: 380de2a2e4dfa0441d7d3019025a1e49 87fd9282cb309fd7abd7be667879e554 696f5e265d911799ecf7416b9c0cf3c0 fbdb2a10bab58532f9a117ddee2b3866. Available online at http://www.jamesrmeyer.com/pdfs/ff_swierczkowski.pdf (November 28, 2015). Russell, Bertrand (1902), "Letter to Frege". In: Heijenoort, Jean van, ed. (1967), From Frege to GÃdel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 1879-1931. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, pp. 124 f. Russell, Bertrand (1908), "Mathematical Logic as based on the Theory of Types". In: American Journal of Mathematics 30, pp. 222-262. Am 09.12.2015 um 19:10 schrieb Gottfried Barrow<igbi at gmx.com>: [...] Really, what would be of more value? A generalized logic that stands the test of time, such as Isabelle/Pure and Isabelle/HOL, or a very narrow logic, such as what you advise? How are people supposed to test the generalized logic, over many years, if the safer route is taken. And an inconsistent logic is not a crisis anyway. An inconsistent logic that can't be fixed with "don't do that" is a crisis. A loss of 30 years, that's a crisis. ZFC is an inconsistent logic that was fixed with "don't do that". It's called the Axiom Schema of Separation. It's ugly, because it demands a new axiom for every subset of a set. Or is "ugly" just a matter of perception? ____________________ Ken Kubota doi: 10.4444/100 http://dx.doi.org/10.4444/100

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